What Is ARP Spoofing?
Key takeaways
- ARP has no authentication built in, so any device on the local broadcast domain can claim to be the gateway for every other device on it.
- The usual outcome is a man-in-the-middle: credentials, session cookies and form data can be read and modified without any visible error to the user.
- Dynamic ARP inspection on the switch blocks forged replies and is the single control that stops the attack at the point where it happens.
- DHCP snooping with a trusted DHCP server and a binding table of learned IP-to-MAC pairs stops an attacker from assigning themselves a victim's address.
- Because ARP is a local protocol, the attack is a local network problem, which is why segmentation and switch configuration matter more than a firewall on the perimeter.
As of 24 October 2026: the service descriptions, prices and turnaround figures on this page are current.
What does an ARP spoofing attack actually do?
It works because ARP has no authentication. When your laptop wants to reach the gateway, it broadcasts a who-has request, and normally the gateway answers. In a spoofing attack, the attacker's machine sends unsolicited replies claiming the gateway address belongs to it, and the victim's machine updates its cache and starts sending traffic to the attacker. The attacker's machine forwards that traffic to the real gateway, so everything still appears to work, but every packet passes through the attacker's machine on the way. From there the attacker can read plaintext traffic, capture cookies for a logged-in session, or modify the content in transit, such as changing the payment details in a form before it is submitted.
Which switch settings stop ARP spoofing?
Three, and they work best together. Dynamic ARP inspection validates ARP replies against a table of what the switch believes the correct bindings are, and drops anything that does not match. DHCP snooping marks the ports connected to your legitimate DHCP server as trusted, and every other port as untrusted, so a device cannot forge DHCP responses and hand out addresses. Third, port security limits how many MAC addresses a port will learn, which stops an attacker plugging in a laptop and claiming several identities. On managed switches, enable these on every access port rather than only in the server room, because the attack works best from an ordinary desk.
How does segmentation reduce the blast radius?
Because ARP only works inside one broadcast domain. If your finance laptops, your CCTV recorders and your guest devices are on separate VLANs, an attacker who compromises one segment cannot poison the ARP tables of another. Put CCTV and IoT on their own VLAN, because those devices are the least maintained and most likely to be the entry point. Put servers on a different VLAN from staff desktops, and enforce the separation with access control lists on the switches rather than relying on the design intent. When an incident does happen, a properly segmented network also means the logs you need to investigate are on far fewer devices.
| Control | What it blocks | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| Dynamic ARP inspection | Forged ARP replies claiming another device's address | Managed switch, on every access port |
| DHCP snooping | Fake DHCP servers handing out the victim's address | Managed switch, with one trusted DHCP server |
| Port security | One port learning many MAC addresses | Switch access port configuration |
| VLAN segmentation | A compromised device poisoning other segments | Switch and firewall design |
| 802.1X | Unauthorised devices joining the network at all | Switch and identity provider |
| Encrypted transport | Traffic being readable in transit even if routed wrongly | HTTPS and VPN on client devices |
What are the frequently asked questions?
Get a straight answer on this
Give us your switch model and VLAN list, and we will tell you which ARP and DHCP snooping features your current configuration is missing.
Send us the details See pricing